Opinion: Security Is a Shared Responsibility
The attack of Sept. 11 created a new reality in America. The awareness of terrorism has spread from the living room to the boardroom. Business is suddenly acutely aware of terrorism as a major threat to profitability. Before 9-11 business risk usually dealt with lost sales, not death or destruction. Today, the threats of biologics or explosives infiltrating our plants and offices is real. Media feed the paranoia, but the basis of concern is genuine. Those who were prone to dismiss certain threats to personnel and profits now open their mail with apprehension. Times have changed.
In commercial transportation, we have seen passenger inspection reach new heights. It is now common to see a National Guardsman with his M-16 at Newark Airport, where just four months ago we would have seen only a complacent, untrained inspector. Addressing the fears of the traveling public is good, but that is merely the first drop in an ocean of need. Clearly, every plan to totally eliminate risk falls short. I believe that the people who changed our way of life are somewhat less likely to repeat the same game plan. We know they are neither naive nor foolish. We also know that they are well-funded and that they have access to weapons of mass destruction. In order to prevent a second attack, we have to think as they do. Planning a threat-assessment strategy can help prevent another tragedy. But how do you plan for a threat when the threat is yet undefined and faceless?
With the current level of awareness and many physical countermeasures in place, we should not have to concern ourselves with a terrorist easily able to penetrate air, rail or bus security. We should be able to ferret out suspicious types and prevent them from getting on board. But what happens when the threat has no face? How do we offer a level of protection that addresses homeland security when the dynamics of such all-encompassing protection are inconceivable and probably unattainable?
What are we doing about examining unattended cargo entering our borders or being shipped domestically? What can be done to ensure a device or biologic is not surreptitiously placed aboard a commercial jet or trailer? What scrutiny do we offer our respective companies as cargo receivers, shippers or carriers to ensure that tendered cargo is free from contamination or worse? The typical answer is usually nothing.
The paranoia against a faceless cargo infiltrator has yet to translate itself into action on the part of government or business. The reason is simple. When a problem appears, reaction is immediate. But that does not create a long-term remedy. Both large and small businesses run an equal risk as any threat would be random.
Some government agencies have instituted programs requiring drivers to be checked and even CDLs to be reissued. Hazmat carriers are instituting employee background checks and the authorities have counseled trucking companies on how to conduct basic vulnerability studies of their business practices and personnel. The Federal Aviation Administration has created a “known shipper” program, requiring air cargo carriers to know their clients before accepting goods.
But little has been done to inspect the cargo itself.
Trucking deals in expedited cargo. Carriers have little time to X-ray packages, much less open cargo as an integrity check. Receivers at larger companies that allow cargo on site before checks are made become vulnerable. Ferreting out “bad” cargo among good cargo is all but impossible without some protocol for evaluation before accepting tendered cargo.
Is there a fix? It is obvious that action comes at a price. Companies that view the problem as acute may wind up spending resources they could have allocated elsewhere. Overkill in addressing these problems can take its toll on staff, workflow and profits. What is the correct level of risk, and at what threshold should companies seek solutions? Who should determine the action plan?
The answer to all of these questions is a simple axiom: Risk-planning is a basic fiduciary responsible of employers. The need to facilitate basic levels of protection of your human, intellectual and physical assets is a clear mandate. With even a basic means in place to reduce risk, your employees and your clients can feel inherently more secure. The system should assess the way you ship and the way you receive cargo and mail. It should attempt to find procedures that offer some level of inspection before unaccompanied cargo gets on your site or is picked up by your driver. Any good system should promote physical containment during transit and an inspection upon delivery. It should create awareness.
Whether it is a carrier instituting a preferred-client system or a shipper requiring pallet locks, each transportation provider and user needs to be aware that cargo can quickly become a vehicle of destruction.
Plan accordingly.
The writer is president of CGM Security Inc., Somerset, N.J., and vice chairman of educational seminars for the National Cargo Security Council, a group of security professionals from all transportation modes.
This story appeared in the Feb. 4 print edition of Transport Topics. Subscribe today.
